China Gray-Zone Influence Operations Target Japan

Chi­na’s gray-zone influ­ence oper­a­tions are tar­get­ing Japan through unau­tho­rized con­sulate activ­i­ties at non­des­ig­nat­ed diplo­mat­ic facil­i­ties. On 19 Novem­ber 2025, The Japan Times report­ed that PRC con­sulates in Japan have con­duct­ed at least 60 gray-zone activ­i­ties across 25 pre­fec­tures and 21 cities since 2017, oper­at­ing one-day con­sulate events at club­hous­es, cul­tur­al cen­ters, hotel meet­ing rooms, and shop­ping streets to strength­en the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty’s Unit­ed Front net­work. The arti­cle begins:

For years now, and with increas­ing fre­quen­cy, the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of Chi­na (PRC) con­sulates in Japan have been open­ly con­duct­ing a series of gray-zone activ­i­ties that like­ly vio­late inter­na­tion­al law, strength­en the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty’s “Unit­ed Front” net­work in Japan and bol­ster its polit­i­cal mobi­liza­tion capa­bil­i­ties for future oper­a­tions. When one thinks of Chi­na’s “gray-zone activ­i­ties,” one gen­er­al­ly thinks of para­mil­i­tary, law-enforce­ment or mil­i­tary coer­cion on sea or land –– such as Chi­na Coast Guard and mar­itime mili­tia harass­ment or PLA air incur­sions –– designed to intim­i­date or harass oth­er nations or push the bound­aries of the PRC’s influ­ence. But gray-zone activ­i­ties also come in the form of sup­posed diplo­mat­ic out­reach that is actu­al­ly designed to under­mine demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions or social cohe­sion with­in a tar­get country.

Read more: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2025/11/19/japan/chinas-gray-zone-activities-in-japan/

Key Points

• Chi­nese con­sulates in Japan have con­duct­ed at least 60 gray-zone activ­i­ties across 25 pre­fec­tures and 21 cities since 2017 through one-day con­sulate events at non­des­ig­nat­ed facil­i­ties, includ­ing club­hous­es, cul­tur­al cen­ters, hotel meet­ing rooms, and shop­ping streets, like­ly vio­lat­ing inter­na­tion­al law unless accred­it­ed by the Japan­ese government.
• After the pop-up event in Oki­nawa in June 2023, the Fukuo­ka Con­sulate pub­lished a WeChat arti­cle high­light­ing par­tic­i­pants’ appre­ci­a­tion for the care and warmth of the moth­er­land, strength­en­ing their sense of belong­ing and pride, with Deputy Con­sul Gen­er­al Cheng Yan pro­mot­ing the CCP’s 20th Nation­al Con­gress prin­ci­ples and encour­ag­ing sup­port for nation­al rejuvenation.
• Chi­nese con­sulates have orga­nized more pop-up events in Oki­nawa than any­where else in Japan, with Bei­jing poten­tial­ly mobi­liz­ing the Unit­ed Front net­work to ampli­fy nar­ra­tives of the unde­ter­mined sta­tus of the Ryukyu Islands, instill anti-Amer­i­can sen­ti­ment, and mag­ni­fy the divi­sion between main­land Japan­ese and Okinawans.
• Pop-up events serve as plat­forms for Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions and polit­i­cal activ­i­ties, rep­re­sent­ing the insti­tu­tion­al­iza­tion of the PRC’s extrater­ri­to­r­i­al law enforce­ment efforts while facil­i­tat­ing intel­li­gence gath­er­ing and sur­veil­lance on for­mer PRC res­i­dents as part of Bei­jing’s transna­tion­al anti-cor­rup­tion and repres­sion campaign.

China Influence Operations Target Japan Through Disinformation and United Front Activities

Chi­na has sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly deployed sophis­ti­cat­ed influ­ence oper­a­tions tar­get­ing Japan through coor­di­nat­ed dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paigns, Unit­ed Front Work activ­i­ties in Oki­nawa, and AI-pow­ered social media manip­u­la­tion designed to under­mine the U.S.-Japan alliance and exploit region­al vulnerabilities.

Bei­jing’s cam­paign against Japan’s Fukushi­ma waste­water release begin­ning in 2023 demon­strat­ed the real-world dan­gers of these oper­a­tions, as coor­di­nat­ed Chi­nese gov­ern­ment mes­sag­ing like­ly con­tributed to anti-Japan­ese vio­lence in Chi­na, includ­ing a fatal stab­bing of a Japan­ese child in Shen­zhen in Sep­tem­ber 2024. Chi­nese-ori­gin clus­ters used AI-gen­er­at­ed pro­file pho­tos to tar­get Myan­mar, Tai­wan, and Japan with con­tent crit­i­ciz­ing gov­ern­ment ties with the Unit­ed States. At the same time, Meta iden­ti­fied thou­sands of fake accounts across 50 plat­forms, in what the com­pa­ny described as Chi­na’s “largest” coor­di­nat­ed oper­a­tion in history.

The strate­gic focus of Chi­na’s influ­ence activ­i­ties cen­ters on Oki­nawa Pre­fec­ture, where Bei­jing lever­ages the island’s his­tor­i­cal ties to Chi­na and local resent­ment toward U.S. mil­i­tary bases to dri­ve wedges between Tokyo, Wash­ing­ton, and Oki­nawan soci­ety. Chi­nese state media out­lets manip­u­late local inci­dents involv­ing U.S. forces to ampli­fy anti-Amer­i­can sentiment.

At the same time, Unit­ed Front Work Depart­ment oper­a­tions cul­ti­vate polit­i­cal rela­tion­ships through eco­nom­ic exchanges, sis­ter-city arrange­ments, and aca­d­e­m­ic insti­tu­tions such as the East Chi­na Sea Research Cen­ter, launched in 2021. Despite Chi­na’s inten­sive efforts, polling reveals that 93 per­cent of Oki­nawans view Chi­na as a threat, match­ing nation­al Japan­ese fig­ures. How­ev­er, Bei­jing’s objec­tive is not to improve its image but rather to deep­en soci­etal divi­sions and iso­late Japan from its pri­ma­ry ally.

Chi­na’s dig­i­tal influ­ence strat­e­gy has evolved to exploit Japan’s unique media con­sump­tion pat­terns, where most cit­i­zens access news through aggre­ga­tor sites rather than social media. Bei­jing’s deploy­ment of AI-pow­ered influ­ence oper­a­tions, as revealed by leaked GoLaxy doc­u­ments, includes sophis­ti­cat­ed psy­cho­log­i­cal pro­fil­ing tar­get­ing pub­lic fig­ures across demo­c­ra­t­ic soci­eties, includ­ing Japan. Chi­nese actors have estab­lished cam­ou­flaged news sites that push pro-Chi­na con­tent through major aggre­ga­tors like Yahoo! News Japan.

At the same time, Ope­nAI con­firmed that Chi­nese groups used arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence to gen­er­ate mul­ti­lin­gual arti­cles in Eng­lish, Japan­ese, Chi­nese, Kore­an, and Russ­ian, attack­ing Japan’s envi­ron­men­tal poli­cies. Japan’s Dig­i­tal Agency, estab­lished in 2021, remains ham­pered by bureau­crat­ic inef­fi­cien­cies that lim­it its capac­i­ty to counter these increas­ing­ly sophis­ti­cat­ed cam­paigns, even as 89 per­cent of Japan­ese respon­dents express con­cern about AI-gen­er­at­ed dis­in­for­ma­tion manip­u­lat­ing pub­lic opinion.

Exter­nal References:

• Japan’s tech­nol­o­gy para­dox: the chal­lenge of Chi­nese dis­in­for­ma­tion – DFRLab
• Equip­ping the Japan‑U.S. Alliance to Han­dle Chi­na’s Dis­in­for­ma­tion Oper­a­tions – RAND Corporation
• Is Japan Immune From Chi­na’s Media Influ­ence Oper­a­tions? – The Diplomat

Dis­claimer: The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) uti­lizes AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing the gen­er­a­tion of sum­maries for news items, intro­duc­tions, key points, and, often, the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, all images are gen­er­at­ed using AI and are intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.