Chinese Influence Operations Target Canada-US Relations

China’s sys­tem­at­ic influ­ence oper­a­tions are exploit­ing dete­ri­o­rat­ing Cana­da-US rela­tions through sophis­ti­cat­ed inter­fer­ence cam­paigns designed to frac­ture North Amer­i­can secu­ri­ty part­ner­ships. Accord­ing to Stephen Nagy’s analy­sis for Real­Clear­World, Bei­jing is posi­tion­ing itself as a reli­able alter­na­tive to Amer­i­can “hege­mon­ic bul­ly­ing” while the Unit­ed Front Work Depart­ment coor­di­nates exten­sive net­works with­in Canada’s Chi­nese dias­po­ra com­mu­ni­ties, busi­ness asso­ci­a­tions, and aca­d­e­m­ic insti­tu­tions to ampli­fy pro-Chi­na nar­ra­tives and sup­press dis­sent. The arti­cle begins:

Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump’s tar­iff threats and aggres­sive nego­ti­a­tion tac­tics are plac­ing unprece­dent­ed strain on the Cana­da-Unit­ed States rela­tion­ship. As Cana­da strug­gles to nav­i­gate these chop­py trade waters, Chi­na is seiz­ing the moment to sow dis­cord and frac­ture North America’s long-stand­ing secu­ri­ty part­ner­ship. Bei­jing has sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly deployed influ­ence oper­a­tions designed to exploit these fric­tions – seek­ing to erode trust in Cana­da among its NORAD and NATO allies, while advanc­ing a nar­ra­tive across the West that Cana­da is an unre­li­able part­ner for AUKUS and QUAD involvement.

Read more: https://www.realclearworld.com/acclrticles/2025/09/03/as_us-canada_ties_unravel_beijing_pulls_the_threads_1132529.htmll

Key Points

• The 2023 Nation­al Secu­ri­ty and Intel­li­gence Com­mit­tee report doc­u­ment­ed how Unit­ed Front Work Depart­ment-affil­i­at­ed orga­ni­za­tions cul­ti­vat­ed rela­tion­ships with Cana­di­an politi­cians through polit­i­cal dona­tions, com­mu­ni­ty events, and busi­ness opportunities
• Chi­nese state-owned enter­pris­es sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly offered lucra­tive con­tracts and board posi­tions to for­mer Cana­di­an politi­cians, cre­at­ing advo­cates for Beijing’s posi­tions with­in Canada’s pol­i­cy­mak­ing circles
• Bei­jing weaponizes accu­sa­tions of anti-Asian racism to deflect crit­i­cism, with Chi­nese Ambas­sador Cong Pei­wu claim­ing Cana­da was “influ­enced by anti-Chi­nese sen­ti­ment” when Par­lia­ment declared Uyghur treat­ment genocide
• Canada’s hes­i­ta­tion to ban Huawei from 5G net­works cre­at­ed a “secu­ri­ty gap” in con­ti­nen­tal telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions, while Chi­nese eco­nom­ic threats blocked adop­tion of CFIUS-style invest­ment screen­ing measures

China’s Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Tar­get Canada’s Elec­tions, Media, and Diaspora

Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions in Cana­da have become increas­ing­ly com­plex, tar­get­ing elec­toral process­es, media, and dias­po­ra com­mu­ni­ties with both dig­i­tal and inter­per­son­al tac­tics. Dur­ing the 2025 fed­er­al elec­tion, author­i­ties uncov­ered sys­tem­at­ic manip­u­la­tion on plat­forms like WeChat, where coor­di­nat­ed cam­paigns ampli­fied pro-Bei­jing mes­sages and dis­par­aged politi­cians crit­i­cal of Chi­na. These oper­a­tions reflect a wider pat­tern of Bei­jing exploit­ing Chi­nese-lan­guage media and com­mu­ni­ty net­works to sup­press dis­sent and shape polit­i­cal out­comes.

Cana­di­an intel­li­gence has repeat­ed­ly warned—including in CSIS brief­in­gs to the Prime Minister’s Office—that China’s efforts to dis­tort news cov­er­age and pres­sure media out­lets have become “nor­mal­ized” and “more insid­i­ous,” mov­ing from crude pro­pa­gan­da to sus­tained, sub­tle cam­paigns. The Unit­ed Front Work Depart­ment, a core CCP organ, cul­ti­vates polit­i­cal rela­tion­ships and co-opts com­mu­ni­ty orga­ni­za­tions under the guise of cul­tur­al or busi­ness exchange, effec­tive­ly mask­ing state involvement.

Accord­ing to a 2024 Cana­di­an gov­ern­ment spe­cial report, such activ­i­ties have includ­ed not only social media influ­ence but also the estab­lish­ment of covert police sta­tions on Cana­di­an soil, the mon­i­tor­ing and intim­i­da­tion of dias­po­ra crit­ics, and eco­nom­ic coer­cion tar­get­ing Cana­di­an busi­ness­es. The cumu­la­tive effect is a per­sis­tent, mul­ti­fac­eted threat to Cana­di­an demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, with both open-source inves­ti­ga­tions and offi­cial inquiries con­firm­ing Beijing’s adap­tive strate­gies and the dif­fi­cul­ty of attribution.

Exter­nal References:
Chi­nese gov­ern­ment inter­fer­ence in Cana­da – Wikipedia
CSIS warns Trudeau China’s tac­tics becom­ing “nor­mal­ized,” “more insid­i­ous” – CBC
Spe­cial Report on For­eign Inter­fer­ence in Canada’s Demo­c­ra­t­ic Insti­tu­tions – Gov­ern­ment of Canada

Disclaimer

The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) employs AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing gen­er­at­ing sum­maries of news items, the intro­duc­tion, key points, and often the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, images are AI-gen­er­at­ed and intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.