Chinese Influence Operations Target Czech Republic Through Investment

Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions in the Czech Repub­lic’s invest­ment net­works to acquire media hold­ings and cul­ti­vate polit­i­cal rela­tion­ships dur­ing the pro-engage­ment era under Pres­i­dent Miloš Zeman. On 10 Novem­ber 2025, the Atlantic Coun­cil report­ed that CEFC Chi­na Ener­gy’s chair­man became Zeman’s eco­nom­ic advis­er while the com­pa­ny acquired stakes in promi­nent Czech media out­lets, with inves­ti­ga­tions rais­ing con­cerns over opaque financ­ing and polit­i­cal influ­ence before CEFC was absorbed by state-owned CITIC Group, giv­ing Bei­jing indi­rect con­trol over key Czech media hold­ings. The arti­cle begins:

Although Czechia emerged as one of the EU’s ear­ly hawks and whistle­blow­ers on Chi­na, its over­all stance has shift­ed marked­ly over the past two decades—oscillating between engage­ment and bal­anc­ing. These fluc­tu­a­tions were large­ly dri­ven by domes­tic polit­i­cal divi­sions and sus­tained Chi­nese influ­ence efforts. Con­tro­ver­sies sur­round­ing Chi­nese invest­ments accel­er­at­ed Czechi­a’s rise as a lead­ing advo­cate of eco­nom­ic secu­ri­ty and “de-risk­ing.” Over the past decade, its approach has alter­nat­ed between neglect and assertive­ness in response to polit­i­cal shifts, eco­nom­ic pres­sures, and chang­ing per­cep­tions of Chi­na’s role in Europe.

Read more: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/czechias-policy-on-china-swinging-between-partnership-and-de-risking/

Key Points

• CEFC Chi­na Ener­gy chair­man Ye Jian­ming became Pres­i­dent Zeman’s eco­nom­ic advis­er while the Shang­hai-based con­glom­er­ate, report­ed­ly linked to the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty, acquired stakes in Czech Air­lines, Lobkow­icz Brew­ery, soc­cer club SK Slavia Prague, adver­tis­ing firm Médea, and sev­er­al land­mark Prague properties.
• After CEFC chair­man Ye was detained in Chi­na in 2018 for alleged eco­nom­ic crimes, the com­pa­ny was absorbed by Chi­nese state-owned CITIC Group, giv­ing Bei­jing indi­rect con­trol over key Czech media hold­ings acquired through the influ­ence network.
• PPF Group, led by bil­lion­aire Petr Kell­ner, chan­neled Chi­nese invest­ments into Czech telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions, finance, and media, with cov­er­age in PPF-friend­ly media often por­tray­ing Chi­nese invest­ment favor­ably while adopt­ing crit­i­cal tones toward the Unit­ed States and EU.
• Czech intel­li­gence annu­al reports con­sis­tent­ly flagged Chi­na as a source of espi­onage and influ­ence oper­a­tions, high­light­ing Chi­nese use of aca­d­e­m­ic and busi­ness chan­nels to cul­ti­vate access and polit­i­cal rela­tion­ships with­in Czech institutions.

China’s Influence Operations in Eastern Europe: Universities, Media, and Elite Capture

Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions in East­ern Europe face mount­ing restric­tions as geopo­lit­i­cal ten­sions reshape region­al dynam­ics. Roma­nia can­celled a $1.5 bil­lion deal with Chi­na to build nuclear reac­tors in 2020, while Poland, the Czech Repub­lic, Roma­nia, and Esto­nia moved to restrict Huawei’s telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions oper­a­tions. The region increas­ing­ly voic­es crit­i­cism of Chi­na’s poli­cies on nation­al minori­ties, Hong Kong, and human rights.

Despite these restric­tions, Chi­na expand­ed its pres­ence through Hun­gar­i­an and Ser­bian uni­ver­si­ties with strate­gic edu­ca­tion­al part­ner­ships. Hun­gary’s plan to host a Fudan Uni­ver­si­ty cam­pus using Chi­nese financ­ing sparked domes­tic back­lash over aca­d­e­m­ic free­dom con­cerns. Three Ser­bian uni­ver­si­ties signed coop­er­a­tion agree­ments with Shang­hai’s Jiao Tong Uni­ver­si­ty in 2018, estab­lish­ing frame­works for stu­dent exchanges and schol­ar­ships. Carnegie Endow­ment research notes these part­ner­ships rep­re­sent sys­tem­at­ic efforts to cul­ti­vate elite rela­tion­ships in busi­ness, pol­i­tics, and academia.

Pro­pa­gan­da laun­der­ing oper­a­tions demon­strate Chi­na’s adap­ta­tion to local con­texts. Chi­na Radio Inter­na­tion­al col­lab­o­rat­ed with Czech alter­na­tive media out­let AC24 to pub­lish dozens of anony­mous arti­cles defend­ing Bei­jing’s Xin­jiang poli­cies. Arti­cles appeared first on CRI before repub­li­ca­tion on AC24, cre­at­ing the appear­ance of inde­pen­dent Czech cov­er­age while con­ceal­ing their Chi­nese ori­gin. The Diplo­mat described this as part of Chi­na’s broad­er approach of coop­er­at­ing with fringe West­ern media out­lets aligned with its for­eign pol­i­cy objectives.

Aca­d­e­m­ic intim­i­da­tion tac­tics emerged when Slo­va­ki­a’s Con­fu­cius Insti­tute direc­tor threat­ened a local Chi­na expert fol­low­ing pub­li­ca­tion of research expos­ing 113 links between Slo­vak insti­tu­tions and Chi­nese enti­ties. The direc­tor sent men­ac­ing mes­sages after the Cen­tral Euro­pean Insti­tute of Asian Stud­ies released find­ings doc­u­ment­ing Chi­nese aca­d­e­m­ic pres­ence across 23 Slo­vak universities.

Insti­tu­tion­al influ­ence extends through Chi­na’s grow­ing net­work of Euro­pean think tanks and lob­by­ing orga­ni­za­tions iden­ti­fied in a 2019 Cor­po­rate Europe Obser­va­to­ry inves­ti­ga­tion. The 16+1 Think Tank Net­work brings togeth­er Cen­tral and East­ern Euro­pean coun­tries to pro­mote the Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive. CEPA analy­sis reveals Chi­na strate­gi­cal­ly tar­gets polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic elites while exploit­ing gaps in infra­struc­ture fund­ing, par­tic­u­lar­ly in coun­tries out­side major West­ern institutions.

Exter­nal References:
• Chi­na’s Influ­ence in South­east­ern, Cen­tral, and East­ern Europe: Vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties and Resilience in Four Coun­tries — Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tion­al Peace
• Coun­ter­ing Chi­na’s Influ­ence Cam­paigns at Euro­pean Uni­ver­si­ties — The Diplomat
• Get­ting Ahead of the Curve: Chi­nese Influ­ence in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe — CEPA

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