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ChinaNovember 13 2025, 8:46 am

Chinese Influence Operations Targeted Italy During Covid Pandemic

Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions tar­get­ed Italy through coor­di­nat­ed dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paigns dur­ing the COVID-19 pan­dem­ic to weak­en Euro­pean cohe­sion and pro­mote Bei­jing’s nar­ra­tive. On 10 Novem­ber 2025, the Atlantic Coun­cil report­ed that Chi­na delib­er­ate­ly dis­tort­ed mask diplo­ma­cy through media, dias­po­ra net­works, and dis­in­for­ma­tion chan­nels, por­tray­ing itself as Italy’s res­cuer while cast­ing the EU as absent. The arti­cle begins:

Italy’s rela­tion­ship with Chi­na is among the old­est in Europe, dat­ing back to the Mid­dle Ages, when Mar­co Polo and oth­er Venet­ian mer­chants trav­eled east along trade routes that would lat­er be known as the Silk Road. Mod­ern engage­ment resumed when Rome rec­og­nized the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of Chi­na (PRC) in 1970—ahead of many oth­er West­ern nations—reflecting Italy’s ambi­tion to diver­si­fy its for­eign pol­i­cy, serve as a bridge between East and West, and expand eco­nom­ic oppor­tu­ni­ties. Until recent­ly, the Sino-Ital­ian rela­tion­ship fluc­tu­at­ed considerably.

Read more: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/italys-policy-on-china-the-belt-and-road-gamble-and-its-aftermath/

Key Points

  • Chi­nese infor­ma­tion oper­a­tions inten­si­fied dur­ing the COVID-19 pan­dem­ic along­side Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da, aim­ing to under­mine demo­c­ra­t­ic debate, pro­mote pro-Chi­na nar­ra­tives, stoke anti-EU Italex­it sen­ti­ment, and weak­en soci­etal cohe­sion in Italy.
  • Bei­jing mobi­lized its dias­po­ra net­work in Italy, one of the largest in Europe with 309,000 peo­ple includ­ing 50,000 stu­dents, blur­ring human­i­tar­i­an engage­ment with influ­ence oper­a­tions con­firmed by Ital­ian par­lia­men­tary intel­li­gence over­sight com­mit­tee reports.
  • Chi­na delib­er­ate­ly dis­tort­ed mask diplo­ma­cy through media, dias­po­ra net­works, and dis­in­for­ma­tion chan­nels, por­tray­ing itself as Italy’s res­cuer while cast­ing the EU as absent, prompt­ing 62 per­cent of Ital­ians to hold neg­a­tive views by late 2020.
  • Reports of unof­fi­cial Chi­nese police sta­tions in Italy emerged as part of broad­er influ­ence oper­a­tions used to mon­i­tor the Chi­nese pop­u­la­tion abroad and force dis­si­dents to return, while six­teen Con­fu­cius Insti­tutes oper­ate with­out clear regulations.

China’s Influence Operations in Italy: CCP Agencies, Confucius Institutes, and Political Penetration

The Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty has sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly deployed influ­ence oper­a­tions across Italy’s polit­i­cal spec­trum through a net­work of state-affil­i­at­ed agen­cies. The CCP Inter­na­tion­al Liai­son Depart­ment, the Chi­nese Asso­ci­a­tion for Friend­ship with For­eign Coun­tries, and the Chi­na Coun­cil for the Pro­mo­tion of Inter­na­tion­al Trade oper­ate as key actors in efforts to coopt par­lia­men­tar­i­ans, polit­i­cal par­ties, local offi­cials, and main­stream voic­es in think tanks and media. These oper­a­tions exploit what researchers iden­ti­fy as “knowl­edge asym­me­try,” using vague appeals to friend­ship and cul­ture to enlist main­stream fig­ures as unwit­ting endorsers of dis­course that nor­mal­izes CCP total­i­tar­i­an rule.

Sev­er­al orga­ni­za­tions func­tion as con­duits for Chi­nese influ­ence with­in Italy’s insti­tu­tion­al frame­work. The Par­lia­men­tary Italy-Chi­na Friend­ship Asso­ci­a­tion, the Insti­tute for Chi­nese Cul­ture, and Open­Gate Chi­na oper­ate across ide­o­log­i­cal divides at nation­al, region­al, and munic­i­pal lev­els, with doc­u­ment­ed ties to high-pro­file Ital­ian polit­i­cal fig­ures span­ning the polit­i­cal spec­trum. These groups have orches­trat­ed del­e­ga­tions to Tibet designed to relay CCP pro­pa­gan­da char­ac­ter­iz­ing Bei­jing’s gov­er­nance as pro­gres­sive devel­op­ment. Beyond cul­tur­al net­works, aca­d­e­m­ic influ­ence has proven sig­nif­i­cant, with Con­fu­cius Insti­tutes embed­ded at 12 Ital­ian uni­ver­si­ties serv­ing as vehi­cles for pro­pa­gan­da while mar­ket­ed as lan­guage and cul­tur­al edu­ca­tion cen­ters. Accord­ing to research on aca­d­e­m­ic free­dom threats, these insti­tutes oper­ate under con­tracts that allow the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment to dic­tate cur­ric­u­la and curate activ­i­ties, with fund­ing flow­ing from the Min­istry of Edu­ca­tion and the CCP’s Pro­pa­gan­da Depart­ment through the Unit­ed Front Work Department.

Italy’s tra­jec­to­ry as a Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive part­ner illus­trates both Bei­jing’s influ­ence strat­e­gy and its lim­i­ta­tions. When Italy became the first G7 nation to sign the BRI agree­ment in March 2019, the gov­ern­ment antic­i­pat­ed sub­stan­tial trade ben­e­fits and invest­ment flows. How­ev­er, Chi­nese for­eign direct invest­ment in Italy col­lapsed from $650 mil­lion in 2019 to just $33 mil­lion by 2021. Italy for­mal­ly with­drew from the Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive in Decem­ber 2023, acknowl­edg­ing the agree­men­t’s fail­ure to deliv­er promised eco­nom­ic gains amid shift­ing geopo­lit­i­cal assess­ments. This pull­back reflects broad­er Euro­pean resis­tance to Chi­nese influ­ence despite con­tin­ued insti­tu­tion­al pen­e­tra­tion through aca­d­e­m­ic and cul­tur­al channels.

Exter­nal References:

Dis­claimer: The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) uti­lizes AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing the gen­er­a­tion of sum­maries for news items, intro­duc­tions, key points, and, often, the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, all images are gen­er­at­ed using AI and are intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.