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ChinaNovember 12 2025, 9:02 am

Chinese-Russian Disinformation Cooperation Targets West

Chi­nese-Russ­ian dis­in­for­ma­tion coop­er­a­tion has emerged as a crit­i­cal com­po­nent of Bei­jing’s sup­port for Moscow’s war in Ukraine through coor­di­nat­ed infor­ma­tion oper­a­tions. On 11 Novem­ber 2025, the Carnegie Endow­ment for Inter­na­tion­al Peace report­ed that Rus­sia and Chi­na are increas­ing­ly coop­er­at­ing on dis­in­for­ma­tion oper­a­tions, with Chi­nese cam­paigns such as Spam­ou­flage being ampli­fied by Russ­ian media out­lets and diplo­mat­ic chan­nels that deploy syn­chro­nized nar­ra­tives on Ukaine  The arti­cle begins:

Both Europe and the Unit­ed States are get­ting impa­tient with Chi­na over Ukraine. It is now clear­er than ever that Bei­jing embold­ens Rus­sia to con­tin­ue its war of aggres­sion by pro­vid­ing Moscow with both mil­i­tary and eco­nom­ic assis­tance. And yet, Europe’s active puni­tive mea­sures against Chi­na still lag far behind its crit­i­cal words. Euro­pean lead­ers need to rec­og­nize the true and extend­ed nature of a part­ner­ship between Bei­jing and Moscow that fus­es mil­i­tary, eco­nom­ic, tech­no­log­i­cal, and infor­ma­tion­al tools to exhaust Ukraine mil­i­tar­i­ly. In essence, Bei­jing evi­dent­ly views the war in Ukraine as a way to tie down U.S. and Euro­pean resources while keep­ing a Chi­na-friend­ly, anti-West­ern regime in the Krem­lin in place.

Read more: https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/11/china-is-the-weak-link-in-europes-ukraine-strategy

Key Points

  • Chi­nese dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paigns such as Spam­ou­flage are ampli­fied by Russ­ian media out­lets and diplo­mat­ic chan­nels, with both coun­tries employ­ing syn­chro­nized nar­ra­tives accus­ing the West of being respon­si­ble for the war in Ukraine.
  • Moscow and Bei­jing have begun deploy­ing gen­er­a­tive AI and fake news por­tals to manip­u­late the infor­ma­tion envi­ron­ment and rein­force each oth­er’s mes­sages, often with­out for­mal coor­di­na­tion between the two governments.
  • The Chi­na-Rus­sia part­ner­ship fus­es mil­i­tary, eco­nom­ic, tech­no­log­i­cal, and infor­ma­tion­al tools to exhaust Ukraine mil­i­tar­i­ly, with Bei­jing view­ing the war as a way to tie down U.S. and Euro­pean resources.
  • Chi­na increas­ing­ly deploys ambi­tious espi­onage and cyber attacks against gov­ern­ment net­works and crit­i­cal infra­struc­ture across Europe, with these attacks appear­ing to over­lap with or be active­ly coor­di­nat­ed with Rus­si­a’s espi­onage and influ­ence operations.

Joint Russian Chinese Influence Operations: Global Disinformation Strategy

Moscow and Bei­jing have pro­gres­sive­ly aligned their infor­ma­tion war­fare capa­bil­i­ties to reshape glob­al dis­course and under­mine demo­c­ra­t­ic process­es across mul­ti­ple con­ti­nents. Rus­sia and Chi­na coor­di­nate dis­in­for­ma­tion nar­ra­tives on con­test­ed geopo­lit­i­cal issues, ampli­fy­ing false claims simul­ta­ne­ous­ly through state media and diplo­mat­ic chan­nels. Dur­ing the Ukraine con­flict, Chi­nese diplo­mats and state media out­lets repeat­ed Russ­ian con­spir­a­cy the­o­ries about alleged U.S. bio­log­i­cal weapons labs—claims Bei­jing ini­tial­ly pro­mot­ed more aggres­sive­ly than Moscow itself. This coor­di­nat­ed approach extends beyond Ukraine, with both author­i­tar­i­an pow­ers pur­su­ing syn­chro­nized elec­tion inter­fer­ence cam­paigns tar­get­ing democ­ra­cies like Cana­da, where Chi­nese and Russ­ian oper­a­tives deployed over­lap­ping tac­tics includ­ing AI-gen­er­at­ed con­tent, inau­then­tic social media ampli­fi­ca­tion, and tar­get­ing of dias­po­ra communities.

The strate­gic part­ner­ship reflects a shared vision to reshape glob­al inter­net gov­er­nance away from West­ern-led frame­works. In a 2019 com­pre­hen­sive strate­gic part­ner­ship agree­ment, Putin and Xi des­ig­nat­ed infor­ma­tion con­trol and inter­net sov­er­eign­ty as cen­tral pil­lars of coop­er­a­tion, estab­lish­ing coor­di­nat­ed media plat­forms like the Chi­na-Rus­sia Head­lines app. Both pow­ers have also iden­ti­fied emerg­ing democ­ra­cies as pri­or­i­ty tar­gets. In Geor­gia, Russ­ian and Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions com­bined mil­i­tary pres­sure with dig­i­tal inter­fer­ence, estab­lish­ing sur­veil­lance infra­struc­ture and exploit­ing elec­toral vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties as Chi­na secured the Anaklia port con­tract while Moscow orches­trat­ed polit­i­cal sub­ver­sion. Sim­i­lar­ly, Russ­ian and Chi­nese actors exploit Amer­i­can polit­i­cal crises through coor­di­nat­ed bot net­works and AI-gen­er­at­ed dis­in­for­ma­tion, delib­er­ate­ly ampli­fy­ing divi­sions dur­ing moments of social instability.

Arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence has dra­mat­i­cal­ly accel­er­at­ed these oper­a­tions’ sophis­ti­ca­tion and scale. State-backed oper­a­tives have deployed AI-gen­er­at­ed deep­fakes, auto­mat­ed account cre­ation sys­tems, and voice-cloning tech­nol­o­gy to spread manip­u­lat­ed nar­ra­tives across plat­forms. Microsoft researchers iden­ti­fied more than 200 instances in 2025 of Russ­ian and Chi­nese state actors weaponiz­ing AI for con­tent creation—a ten­fold increase since 2023—demonstrating the expo­nen­tial growth of machine-assist­ed influ­ence oper­a­tions. This tech­no­log­i­cal con­ver­gence has proven par­tic­u­lar­ly effec­tive in tar­get­ing pop­u­la­tions vul­ner­a­ble to coor­di­nat­ed mes­sag­ing strate­gies, cre­at­ing what secu­ri­ty ana­lysts describe as increas­ing­ly indis­tin­guish­able fake con­tent that chal­lenges both gov­ern­men­tal and plat­form-based detec­tion mechanisms.

Exter­nal References:

Dis­claimer: The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) uti­lizes AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing the gen­er­a­tion of sum­maries for news items, intro­duc­tions, key points, and, often, the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, all images are gen­er­at­ed using AI and are intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.