NATO Paper Identifies Chinese Influence Actors Abroad

NATO’s Cen­tre of Excel­lence for Coun­ter­ing Hybrid Threats has pub­lished a study exam­in­ing China’s use of non-state actors (NSA) as state prox­ies, argu­ing that under Xi Jin­ping, the polit­i­cal con­trol of the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty (CCP) has advanced in all non-state, non-par­ty orga­ni­za­tions. Accord­ing to the study:

June 2021 In addi­tion to vis­i­ble state pow­er, cor­po­ra­tions and civ­il soci­ety rep­re­sent an addi­tion­al pow­er dimen­sion for the Par­ty. While the lack of trans­paren­cy com­pli­cates the iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of state proxy NSAs [non-state actors, ed.], dif­fer­ent enti­ties with­in the larg­er unit­ed front approach nonethe­less enable large-scale espi­onage, influ­ence oper­a­tions, and polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic coer­cion. Los­ing key tech­nol­o­gy to Chi­na through cor­po­rate takeovers or joint ven­tures risks increas­ing depen­den­cy on Chi­na. It also cre­ates vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties to polit­i­cal influ­ence and espi­onage, as Chi­nese com­pa­nies are required by law to coop­er­ate with Par­ty officials.

Read the full study here.

The study also pro­vides an overview and exam­ples of the main proxy non-state actors of the Chi­nese state that are active inter­na­tion­al­ly, list­ing unit­ed front-relat­ed actors, SOEs, GON­GOs, as well as media- and acad­e­mia-relat­ed actors and their activ­i­ties abroad. Accord­ing to the study, all actors and their activ­i­ties dis­cussed can be con­sid­ered part of the more wide-reach­ing unit­ed front work. Fol­low­ing Chi­nese influ­ence actors are identified:

• Unit­ed front-relat­ed actors: 
  • The Coun­cil for the Pro­mo­tion of the Peace­ful Reuni­fi­ca­tion of Chi­na (CPPRC)
  • The Chi­na Inter­na­tion­al Cul­ture Exchange Cen­tre (CICEC)
  • The Chi­na Asso­ci­a­tion for Inter­na­tion­al Friend­ly Con­tact (CAIFC)
  • Wen­zhou Fed­er­a­tion of Indus­try and Business

• State-con­trolled enterprises: 
  • Huawei
  • Export-Import Bank of China
  • Chi­na Devel­op­ment Bank
  • Indus­tri­al & Com­mer­cial Bank of China
  • Sino-sure
  • Skyri­zon Aviation
  • BGI Group
  • Chi­na Nation­al Fisheries

• State-orga­nized NGOs: 
  • China’s Red Cross

• Media:
  • Xin­hua
  • CGTN
  • Chi­na Radio
  • Chi­na Daily
  • The People’s Daily
  • Chi­na Cen­tral Television
  • Chi­na News Service
  • Glob­al Times
  • Asi­askop

• Acad­e­mia and think tanks: 
  • Con­fu­cius Institutes
  • Chi­nese Schol­ars Associations
  • Insti­tute for Chi­na-Amer­i­ca Studies
  • Chi­na-CEE Institute
  • Chi­nese Acad­e­my of Social Sciences

• Online and dig­i­tal actors 
  • Paid inter­net trolls
  • Fifty Cent Par­ty (wumao)

The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) has cov­ered Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions abroad, including:

• In July, we report­ed that the New York Times cov­ered a Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tion on YouTube, first exposed by a GIOR inves­ti­ga­tion in March.

• In June, we rec­om­mend­ed a report on China’s for­eign influ­ence oper­a­tions in Canada.

• In May, we report­ed that Chi­na had become the top spender on for­eign influ­ence oper­a­tions in the US, with Chi­nese for­eign agent spend­ing sky­rock­et­ing from just over $10 mil­lion in 2016 to near­ly $64 mil­lion in 2020.