Russian Influence on Central European Elections: Disinformation to Erosion

Russ­ian influ­ence over Cen­tral Euro­pean elec­tions has evolved beyond tra­di­tion­al dis­in­for­ma­tion into sys­tem­at­ic demo­c­ra­t­ic ero­sion. On June 17, 2025, Fair Observ­er report­ed that Moscow’s oper­a­tions in Poland and Roma­nia demon­strate how for­eign inter­fer­ence cat­alyzes domes­tic unrest through divi­sive cam­paigns tar­get­ing migra­tion, minor­i­ty rights, and his­tor­i­cal griev­ances to depress vot­er turnout and strength­en pop­ulist forces aligned with Russ­ian inter­ests. The arti­cle begins:

The glob­al fight against for­eign influ­ence has entered a pre­car­i­ous phase. In April, US Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump shut down the last State Depart­ment office specif­i­cal­ly tasked with coun­ter­ing for­eign infor­ma­tion manip­u­la­tion, rais­ing con­cerns about America’s vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty to the effects of influ­ence oper­a­tions by Rus­sia, Chi­na and Iran. Crit­ics warn that this “uni­lat­er­al dis­ar­ma­ment” leaves demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions increas­ing­ly exposed at a time when hos­tile actors are inten­si­fy­ing their dig­i­tal cam­paigns. Against this back­drop, under­stand­ing and coun­ter­ing Russ­ian efforts of hybrid war­fare in Cen­tral and East­ern Europe (CEE) has nev­er been more urgent. While the means have mod­ern­ized, the core tac­tics remain unchanged. In con­tem­po­rary CEE, Russ­ian cam­paigns aim to desta­bi­lize gov­ern­ments, under­mine pub­lic trust in insti­tu­tions and loosen the region’s inte­gra­tion with the EU and NATO. These oper­a­tions exploit divi­sive issues — migra­tion, minor­i­ty rights, his­tor­i­cal griev­ances — to inflame cul­tur­al ten­sions and depress vot­er turnout, there­by strength­en­ing pop­ulist or Euroscep­tic forces that align with Moscow’s strate­gic inter­ests. These efforts extend beyond influ­enc­ing elec­tion out­comes. They aim to cor­rode pub­lic con­fi­dence in demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance itself. While trust in nation­al par­lia­ments and the EU has fluc­tu­at­ed over the past two decades, it has remained rel­a­tive­ly sta­ble — for now.

Read more: https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-influence-in-central-europe-evolves-from-disinformation-to-democratic-erosion/

Key Points

• Roma­ni­a’s elec­tion saw far-right can­di­date Călin Georges­cu surge from 1% to 23% through Russ­ian-backed Tik­Tok cam­paigns before being barred from the resched­uled vote.
• Russ­ian oper­a­tions in Poland used “Over­load” and “Dop­pel­gänger” tac­tics, spread­ing con­tra­dic­to­ry infor­ma­tion and imper­son­at­ing trust­ed media out­lets to dis­cred­it can­di­dates and dis­cour­age voting.
• Despite 87.5% Roman­ian sup­port for EU and NATO, two-thirds see them­selves as “sec­ond-class cit­i­zens in Europe,” cre­at­ing vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty to anti-estab­lish­ment messaging.
• The analy­sis warns that for­eign influ­ence cam­paigns begin online but achieve dis­rup­tive effects offline as vot­ers chan­nel frus­tra­tion into sup­port for fringe can­di­dates, caus­ing long-term insti­tu­tion­al damage.

Russian Influence Tactics in Central European Elections

Russ­ian influ­ence in Cen­tral Euro­pean elec­tions has evolved into a com­plex web of coor­di­nat­ed dig­i­tal cam­paigns, lever­ag­ing social media manip­u­la­tion, cyber­at­tacks, and the cul­ti­va­tion of domes­tic polit­i­cal allies to desta­bi­lize demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions and ampli­fy pro-Krem­lin nar­ra­tives. Recent cas­es in Poland and Roma­nia demon­strate both the per­sis­tence and adap­ta­tion of these tac­tics, with Russ­ian-backed dis­in­for­ma­tion net­works tar­get­ing far-right and nation­al­ist can­di­dates to exploit soci­etal divi­sions and weak­en sup­port for the EU and NATO.

While Poland’s “elec­tion umbrel­la” strat­e­gy and robust pub­lic resis­tance have blunt­ed the impact of such cam­paigns, Romania’s experience—marked by the Con­sti­tu­tion­al Court’s annul­ment of manip­u­lat­ed elec­tion results—underscores the vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty of dig­i­tal infra­struc­ture and the urgent need for transat­lantic coor­di­na­tion to counter hybrid threats. The Kremlin’s approach increas­ing­ly relies on opaque eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal patron­age, fos­ter­ing an “unvir­tu­ous cir­cle” that erodes demo­c­ra­t­ic stan­dards and encour­ages illib­er­al pol­i­cy stances, as doc­u­ment­ed in stud­ies by the CSIS Europe Pro­gram and the Bul­gar­i­an Cen­ter for the Study of Democracy.

Mean­while, Russia’s use of media out­lets like Voice of Europe and sophis­ti­cat­ed cyber oper­a­tions exem­pli­fies a broad­er strat­e­gy to under­mine pub­lic trust, influ­ence elec­toral out­comes, and strength­en alliances with sym­pa­thet­ic domes­tic actors23. These efforts are not lim­it­ed to direct inter­fer­ence but aim to cor­rode con­fi­dence in demo­c­ra­t­ic gov­er­nance itself, exploit­ing vul­ner­a­bil­i­ties in under­fund­ed inde­pen­dent media and weak civ­il soci­ety sec­tors across the region.

Exter­nal References:

1. The Krem­lin Playbook

2. Spies, agents of influ­ence and dis­in­for­ma­tion: Rus­sia redou­bles its oper­a­tions ahead of the Euro­pean elections

3. Intel­Brief: Russ­ian Inter­fer­ence Tac­tics in Euro­pean Demo­c­ra­t­ic Process­es Ramp Up

Disclaimer

The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) employs AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing gen­er­at­ing sum­maries of news items, the intro­duc­tion, key points, and often the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, images are AI-gen­er­at­ed and intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.