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ChinaOctober 8 2025, 5:07 am

UK National Security Advisor Met Chinese Influence Group Before Appointment

Jonathan Pow­ell, Sir Keir Starmer’s nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er, held talks with a Chi­nese orga­ni­za­tion that US secu­ri­ty offi­cials pre­vi­ous­ly warned was involved in for­eign influ­ence oper­a­tions, eight months before he was appoint­ed to his gov­ern­ment role. On 7 Octo­ber 2025, The Tele­graph report­ed that Pow­ell met with the Chi­nese Peo­ple’s Asso­ci­a­tion for Friend­ship with For­eign Coun­tries in Bei­jing in March 2024, an orga­ni­za­tion that the US State Depart­ment had warned was tasked with co-opt­ing sub­na­tion­al gov­ern­ments. The arti­cle begins:

Sir Keir Starmer’s nation­al secu­ri­ty advis­er met with a “malign” Chi­nese organ­i­sa­tion months before he entered the Gov­ern­ment. Jonathan Pow­ell held talks in Bei­jing with the Chi­nese Peo­ple’s Asso­ci­a­tion for Friend­ship with For­eign Coun­tries (CPAFFC) in March 2024, eight months before he was appoint­ed as the Prime Min­is­ter’s top aide on nation­al secu­ri­ty mat­ters. The US state depart­ment issued an alert about the organ­i­sa­tion in 2020, warn­ing that it had been tasked with “co-opt­ing sub­na­tion­al gov­ern­ments” and had “sought to direct­ly and malign­ly influ­ence state and local lead­ers to pro­mote” Chi­na’s glob­al agen­da. In 2022, the US Nation­al Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence and Secu­ri­ty Cen­tre also said that CPAFFC was involved with “for­eign influ­ence oper­a­tions” tied to the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty (CCP).

Read more: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/10/07/powell-malign-chinese-group-before-joining-starmer-team-uk/

Key Points

  • The US State Depart­ment issued an alert about CPAFFC in 2020, warn­ing it had been tasked with co-opt­ing sub­na­tion­al gov­ern­ments and sought to direct­ly and malign­ly influ­ence state and local lead­ers to pro­mote Chi­na’s glob­al agenda.
  • The US Nation­al Coun­ter­in­tel­li­gence and Secu­ri­ty Cen­tre said in 2022 that CPAFFC was involved with for­eign influ­ence oper­a­tions tied to the Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty and was entrust­ed to devel­op sis­ter rela­tion­ships that pres­sured orga­ni­za­tions to sev­er ties with enti­ties the CCP deemed problematic.
  • Pow­ell is under­stood to have chaired a White­hall meet­ing in Sep­tem­ber to dis­cuss whether Britain could describe Chi­na as an ene­my in a col­lapsed espi­onage case with­out upset­ting diplo­mat­ic rela­tions with Pres­i­dent Xi Jinping.
  • The Tele­graph revealed Pow­ell qui­et­ly vis­it­ed Bei­jing in July to hold talks with Wang Yi, his Chi­nese coun­ter­part, as part of a trip only report­ed by Chi­nese state media, and has made at least three fur­ther vis­its to Chi­na since August 2023.

China’s Influence Operations in the UK: Elite Capture, Parliamentary Infiltration, and Academic Penetration

Chi­nese influ­ence oper­a­tions in the Unit­ed King­dom have evolved into a sophis­ti­cat­ed mul­ti-lay­ered chal­lenge tar­get­ing British insti­tu­tions through elite net­works, par­lia­men­tary infil­tra­tion, aca­d­e­m­ic part­ner­ships, and media manip­u­la­tion. Secu­ri­ty agen­cies pub­licly iden­ti­fied Chris­tine Lee, a promi­nent Lon­don lawyer, as engaged in long-term polit­i­cal inter­fer­ence activ­i­ties linked to the Unit­ed Front Work Depart­ment, with MI5 warn­ing that she facil­i­tat­ed over £400,000 in dona­tions to Labour MP Bar­ry Gar­diner while her son worked in his par­lia­men­tary office. The MI5 alert rep­re­sent­ed an unprece­dent­ed pub­lic dis­clo­sure iden­ti­fy­ing an indi­vid­ual as a Chi­nese agent, demon­strat­ing height­ened con­cern about covert polit­i­cal manip­u­la­tion tar­get­ing politi­cians across par­ty lines.

Beyond indi­vid­ual agents, Bei­jing has cul­ti­vat­ed insti­tu­tion­al vehi­cles for influ­ence. The 48 Group Club serves as Chi­na’s pri­ma­ry mech­a­nism for elite cap­ture in Britain, gath­er­ing for­mer Prime Min­is­ter Tony Blair, mem­bers of the House of Lords, and senior busi­ness exec­u­tives who inter­act with Chi­nese Com­mu­nist Par­ty oper­a­tives, includ­ing for­mer ambas­sadors and vice-min­is­ters. The orga­ni­za­tion pub­lish­es con­tent from Chi­nese state media out­lets and its mem­bers open­ly advo­cate for Bei­jing’s pol­i­cy objec­tives, exem­pli­fy­ing how Chi­na deploys busi­ness net­works to shape elite opin­ion. The Unit­ed Front sys­tem oper­ates through friend­ship asso­ci­a­tions and stu­dent groups that pres­sure uni­ver­si­ty admin­is­tra­tors to can­cel vis­its from crit­ics like the Dalai Lama and cen­sor art­work crit­i­cal of CCP actions in Xin­jiang, demon­strat­ing Chi­na’s abil­i­ty to con­strain aca­d­e­m­ic free­dom on British campuses.

Chi­na’s influ­ence extends into dig­i­tal and aca­d­e­m­ic spheres with alarm­ing scope. The gov­ern­ment has fund­ed British YouTu­bers through Chi­nese Radio Inter­na­tion­al to pro­duce pro-Chi­na pro­pa­gan­da videos with titles like “West­ern media lies about Chi­na” and “Cam­era sur­veil­lance is great in Chi­na,” exploit­ing social media plat­forms to shape pub­lic opin­ion. Mean­while, UK uni­ver­si­ties have con­duct­ed near­ly 1,400 joint stud­ies with Chi­nese sci­en­tists in mil­i­tar­i­ly sen­si­tive fields—more than any oth­er Euro­pean nation—as part of what researchers describe as a well-thought-out strat­e­gy to advance Chi­na’s tech­no­log­i­cal, eco­nom­ic, and mil­i­tary pow­er. This aca­d­e­m­ic col­lab­o­ra­tion rais­es seri­ous ques­tions about knowl­edge trans­fer that could enhance Bei­jing’s capa­bil­i­ties while British insti­tu­tions remain vul­ner­a­ble to Chi­nese influence.

The UK’s response has been notably con­strained despite doc­u­ment­ed threats. When Britain intro­duced its For­eign Influ­ence Reg­is­tra­tion Scheme in Jan­u­ary 2025, Chi­na remained con­spic­u­ous­ly absent from the “enhanced tier” requir­ing com­pre­hen­sive activ­i­ty dec­la­ra­tions, despite Par­lia­men­t’s Intel­li­gence and Secu­ri­ty Com­mit­tee hav­ing found in 2023 that Chi­na engaged in aggres­sive inter­fer­ence tar­get­ing British acad­e­mia and pol­i­tics. Con­ser­v­a­tive MPs crit­i­cized this exclu­sion, argu­ing that it pri­or­i­tizes eco­nom­ic links over nation­al secu­ri­ty. In con­trast, the reg­is­tra­tion scheme places only Rus­sia and Iran under the most strin­gent mon­i­tor­ing require­ments, reflect­ing the del­i­cate bal­anc­ing act that British pol­i­cy­mak­ers face between eco­nom­ic engage­ment with Chi­na and pro­tect­ing demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions from for­eign manipulation.

Exter­nal References:

Dis­claimer:
The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) uti­lizes AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing the gen­er­a­tion of sum­maries for news items, intro­duc­tions, key points, and, often, the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, all images are gen­er­at­ed using AI and are intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.