Russia Intensifies Disinformation Operations in Baltic States

Rus­sia is inten­si­fy­ing dis­in­for­ma­tion oper­a­tions in the Baltic states through sys­tem­at­ic recruit­ment of local res­i­dents. On 19 Novem­ber 2025, Anadolu Agency report­ed that Russ­ian intel­li­gence ser­vices recruit Lat­vian res­i­dents via Telegram chan­nels and dur­ing trips to Rus­sia, tar­get­ing low-income groups and young peo­ple seek­ing mon­ey. The arti­cle begins:

Rus­sia is alleged­ly inten­si­fy­ing its dis­in­for­ma­tion and pro­pa­gan­da oper­a­tions against West­ern coun­tries, par­tic­u­lar­ly in the Baltic states, Lithuan­ian broad­cast­er LRT report­ed Tues­day. Russ­ian intel­li­gence ser­vices have been recruit­ing Lat­vian res­i­dents via Telegram chan­nels or dur­ing trips to Rus­sia to spread their views, accord­ing to the report. Those tar­get­ed are report­ed­ly drawn from low-income groups or young peo­ple seek­ing to earn mon­ey. LRT cit­ed the case of video­g­ra­ph­er and blog­ger Oleg Besedin, who was arrest­ed in Esto­nia in ear­ly Novem­ber after years of alleged­ly coop­er­at­ing with Moscow out­lets, pro­duc­ing doc­u­men­taries and reports aligned with Krem­lin rhetoric.

Read more: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-steps-up-disinformation-propaganda-efforts-in-baltic-states-report/3747972

Key Points

• Russ­ian intel­li­gence ser­vices recruit Lat­vian res­i­dents via Telegram chan­nels or dur­ing trips to Rus­sia, tar­get­ing low-income groups and young peo­ple seek­ing mon­ey to spread Krem­lin views, with the Eston­ian State Pros­e­cu­tor stat­ing recruit­ed indi­vid­u­als receive spe­cif­ic instruc­tions on sto­ries to pub­lish and polit­i­cal direc­tions to support.
• Video­g­ra­ph­er Oleg Besedin was arrest­ed in Esto­nia in ear­ly Novem­ber after years of alleged­ly coop­er­at­ing with Moscow out­lets pro­duc­ing doc­u­men­taries and reports aligned with Krem­lin rhetoric, sus­pect­ed of par­tic­i­pat­ing in infor­ma­tion influ­ence cam­paigns in coop­er­a­tion with peo­ple who live and work in Russia.
• Lat­vian pro-Krem­lin activist Alek­san­drs Gapo­nenko claimed dur­ing an online con­fer­ence host­ed by the Insti­tute for CIS Coun­tries that eth­no­cide was tak­ing place in Latvia, argu­ing Moscow would need to pre­pare ide­o­log­i­cal ground­work before pur­su­ing human­i­tar­i­an inter­ven­tion in the Baltic states, lead­ing to charges of assist­ing a for­eign state.
• The Fund for the Sup­port and Pro­tec­tion of Com­pa­tri­ots Liv­ing Abroad, over­seen by the Russ­ian For­eign Min­istry, con­tin­ues financ­ing Russ­ian influ­ence oper­a­tions in Baltic states and cov­er­ing legal costs for pro-Krem­lin activists fac­ing law­suits, accord­ing to the Con­sti­tu­tion Pro­tec­tion Bureau.

Russia’s Influence Operations in the Baltics: Targeting Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

Russ­ian influ­ence oper­a­tions in the Baltic states have inten­si­fied dra­mat­i­cal­ly since Moscow’s full-scale inva­sion of Ukraine, tar­get­ing Esto­nia, Latvia, and Lithua­nia through a sophis­ti­cat­ed blend of social media manip­u­la­tion, dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paigns, and cyber-enabled oper­a­tions. Moscow exploits Russ­ian-speak­ing minori­ties through plat­forms like Telegram, Tik­Tok, and Face­book, spread­ing nar­ra­tives that por­tray Baltic lan­guage poli­cies as dis­crim­i­na­tion while false­ly brand­ing restric­tions on Russ­ian state media as vio­la­tions of free speech com­pa­ra­ble to Nazi actions. Recent inves­ti­ga­tions reveal that Rus­sia pays young Baltic res­i­dents to spread pro-Krem­lin nar­ra­tives, with Eston­ian author­i­ties detain­ing video­g­ra­ph­er Oleg Besedin for fol­low­ing direct Russ­ian intel­li­gence instruc­tions on influ­ence campaigns.

The strate­gic depth of these oper­a­tions extends far beyond dig­i­tal plat­forms. Secret Krem­lin doc­u­ments obtained by inter­na­tion­al jour­nal­ists reveal that Rus­si­a’s Direc­torate for Cross-Bor­der Coop­er­a­tion pre­pared com­pre­hen­sive plans in autumn 2021 to enhance soft pow­er through edu­ca­tion, cul­ture, and social net­works while fund­ing pro-Russ­ian NGOs, pre­serv­ing Russ­ian-lan­guage edu­ca­tion, and oppos­ing Sovi­et mon­u­ment demo­li­tions. A 136-page ana­lyt­i­cal report released by Rus­sia detailed strate­gies to bypass pro­pa­gan­da restric­tions by exploit­ing plat­forms with large Russ­ian-speak­ing audi­ences. Beyond infor­ma­tion war­fare, the state-spon­sored cyber espi­onage group UNC1151 con­ducts the “Ghost­writer” cam­paign, pro­mot­ing anti-NATO nar­ra­tives while com­pro­mis­ing social media accounts of Pol­ish offi­cials to pub­lish polit­i­cal­ly dis­rup­tive content.

Research demon­strates a mea­sur­able impact on region­al sta­bil­i­ty. Quan­ti­ta­tive stud­ies found that Russ­ian dis­in­for­ma­tion increas­es per­ceived dis­trust of gov­ern­ments and height­ens the sense of mil­i­tary threat, with observ­able decreas­es in cit­i­zens’ incen­tives for invest­ment activ­i­ties. Lithuan­ian secu­ri­ty ser­vices report approx­i­mate­ly 900 Russ­ian-lan­guage false warn­ings about school explo­sives, timed to coin­cide with aca­d­e­m­ic sched­ules and teach­ers’ strikes. Moscow has also legit­imized fringe dis­in­for­ma­tion out­lets like “The Baltic Word” through Krem­lin-owned media such as Balt­news and Sput­nik, there­by grant­i­ng cred­i­bil­i­ty to sources linked to cyber-espi­onage campaigns.

The Baltic states have respond­ed with com­pre­hen­sive pro­tec­tive mea­sures. Esto­nia tran­si­tioned to Eston­ian-only school instruc­tion by 2030 and enact­ed leg­is­la­tion requir­ing the Russ­ian Ortho­dox Church to sev­er ties with the Moscow Patri­ar­chate, while Latvia man­dat­ed that pub­lic media broad­cast exclu­sive­ly in Lat­vian or Euro­pean lan­guages by 2026 and amend­ed immi­gra­tion laws requir­ing Russ­ian nation­als to pass lan­guage tests. For­mer Lat­vian Pres­i­dent Egils Lev­its empha­sized that nation­al cohe­sion serves as the pri­ma­ry defense against Moscow’s “unde­feat­ed impe­ri­al­is­tic spirit.”

Exter­nal References:
• Secret Krem­lin doc­u­ment reveals Rus­si­a’s plans for Baltic states
• The Baltic States as Tar­gets and Levers: The Role of the Region in Russ­ian Strategy
• Russ­ian influ­ence oper­a­tions against Baltic states and Poland hav­ing ‘sig­nif­i­cant impact’ on society

 Dis­claimer: The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) uti­lizes AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing the gen­er­a­tion of sum­maries for news items, intro­duc­tions, key points, and, often, the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, all images are gen­er­at­ed using AI and are intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.

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