Russia Targets Russian Speakers in Baltic Countries Through Social Media

Rus­sia Baltic states Russ­ian-speak­ing minori­ties have become tar­gets of sys­tem­at­ic influ­ence oper­a­tions accord­ing to Ukrain­ian media analy­sis. On August 19, 2025, UNITED24 Media report­ed that Moscow uses social media plat­forms to exploit eth­nic divi­sions in Esto­nia, Latvia, and Lithua­nia, shift­ing from banned state TV chan­nels to Telegram, Tik­Tok, Face­book, and X to spread claims of dis­crim­i­na­tion against Russ­ian speak­ers. The arti­cle begins:

If your coun­try has any Russ­ian-speak­ing com­mu­ni­ties, Rus­sia may see an oppor­tu­ni­ty to assert influ­ence. For decades, Moscow has exploit­ed lan­guage and dis­in­for­ma­tion to advance its strate­gic goals and lay the ground­work for future inva­sions. This approach has been used repeat­ed­ly. In Geor­gia, Russ­ian pol­i­cy stoked ten­sions in the Tskhin­vali region and Abk­hazia, cul­mi­nat­ing in the 2006 “referendum”—an over­whelm­ing vote for inde­pen­dence con­duct­ed under heavy Russ­ian influ­ence and wide­ly reject­ed as ille­git­i­mate by both Geor­gia and the inter­na­tion­al community.

Read more: https://united24media.com/anti-fake/if-your-country-has-a-russian-speaking-minority-russia-will-turn-it-against-you-the-baltics-case-10885

Key Points

• Russ­ian pro­pa­gan­da on social media por­trays Baltic gov­ern­ment lan­guage poli­cies as dis­crim­i­na­tion while brand­ing restric­tions on Russ­ian state media as “free speech vio­la­tions” and com­par­ing them to Nazi actions.
• Face­book accounts dis­guised as local com­mu­ni­ty groups like “Tallinners” or “Russ­ian-speak­ing Esto­nia” push nar­ra­tives that aid to Ukraine is “fool­ish” and that “life was bet­ter with Russia.”
• The Baltic states respond­ed with pro­tec­tive mea­sures includ­ing Estonia’s tran­si­tion to Eston­ian-only school instruc­tion by 2030 and Latvia’s 2026 man­date for pub­lic media exclu­sive­ly in Lat­vian or Euro­pean languages.
• For­mer Lat­vian Pres­i­dent Egils Lev­its empha­sized that nation­al cohe­sion and clear iden­ti­ty serve as the pri­ma­ry defense against Russ­ian inter­fer­ence, warn­ing of Moscow’s “unde­feat­ed impe­ri­al­is­tic spirit.”

Russian Influence Operations in the Baltics

Russia’s influ­ence oper­a­tions in the Baltic states are deeply embed­ded in the region’s social, polit­i­cal, and reli­gious fab­ric, pur­su­ing ide­o­log­i­cal lever­age through a blend of soft pow­er, proxy net­works, and dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paigns that exploit local eth­nic Russ­ian com­mu­ni­ties and long­stand­ing Sovi­et-era ties. In Esto­nia, the gov­ern­ment has tak­en leg­isla­tive action to curb Russ­ian Church influ­ence by man­dat­ing a break with the Moscow Patri­ar­chate, reflect­ing anx­i­eties over the Russ­ian Ortho­dox Church’s role as both a spir­i­tu­al body and a vehi­cle for Krem­lin-aligned nar­ra­tives amid height­ened region­al tensions.

This legal response is emblem­at­ic of broad­er Baltic efforts to insu­late inter­nal insti­tu­tions from Russ­ian hybrid influ­ence, which also includes detailed Russ­ian strate­gies for polit­i­cal, social, and cul­tur­al pen­e­tra­tion out­lined in recent ana­lyt­i­cal reports. Moscow’s play­book lever­ages the region’s Russ­ian-speak­ing minorities—via Krem­lin-linked media, NGOs, and cul­tur­al organizations—to pro­mote nar­ra­tives that dis­trust nation­al gov­ern­ments, ampli­fy social divi­sions, and nor­mal­ize per­cep­tions of mil­i­tary threat, as quan­ti­ta­tive stud­ies have doc­u­ment­ed sig­nif­i­cant increas­es in pub­lic skep­ti­cism toward state insti­tu­tions and height­ened sens­es of vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty to con­flict.

These oper­a­tions are not con­fined to infor­ma­tion war­fare: Russ­ian eco­nom­ic inter­ests, ener­gy depen­den­cies, and polit­i­cal prox­ies his­tor­i­cal­ly pro­vid­ed addi­tion­al pres­sure points, though Baltic inte­gra­tion into EU and NATO struc­tures, ener­gy diver­si­fi­ca­tion, and proac­tive counter-dis­in­for­ma­tion poli­cies have sharply reduced Moscow’s coer­cive lever­age in recent years. Nonethe­less, the per­sis­tence of Russ­ian disinformation—now ampli­fied by dig­i­tal plat­forms and AI—continues to chal­lenge soci­etal cohe­sion, requir­ing ongo­ing vig­i­lance, media lit­er­a­cy pro­grams, and transna­tion­al coor­di­na­tion to safe­guard demo­c­ra­t­ic resilience in the region.

Exter­nal References:

1. Russia’s Infor­ma­tion Influ­ence Oper­a­tions in the Nordic-Baltic Region
2. The Russ­ian Dias­po­ra in the Baltic States: Auton­o­my, Influ­ence and the Lim­its of Krem­lin Soft Power
3. Does the Russ­ian Influ­ence Strat­e­gy Work in the Baltic Countries?

Disclaimer

The Glob­al Influ­ence Oper­a­tions Report (GIOR) employs AI through­out the post­ing process, includ­ing gen­er­at­ing sum­maries of news items, the intro­duc­tion, key points, and often the “con­text” sec­tion. We rec­om­mend ver­i­fy­ing all infor­ma­tion before use. Addi­tion­al­ly, images are AI-gen­er­at­ed and intend­ed sole­ly for illus­tra­tive pur­pos­es. While they rep­re­sent the events or indi­vid­u­als dis­cussed, they should not be inter­pret­ed as real-world photography.